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Release of Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan
by Hari M. Osofsky
1 China recently has released two of its most prominent dissidents,
Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan, into exile in the United States. The releases
corresponded to major United States-Chinese diplomatic initiatives
without broader gains in allowing political dissent, causing a number of
commentators to refer to them as "hostage-diplomacy."' This New
Development explores what it means to think of the releases in this way
and the implications for future strategic engagement with China.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS BARGAINING AS HOSTAGE-DIPLOMACY?
[2 Calling the symbolic releases hostage-diplomacy analogizes them to
negotiating with terrorists! Such a comparison raises difficult issues.
Although both uses of the term share the core notion of bargaining over
human lives, the Chinese situation differs in a critical way-the people
involved are Chinese citizens, not citizens of the state negotiating for their
release.
3 When American hostages are held by terrorist organizations, ties of
nationality give the United States authority to make decisions over their
destiny. It can choose to risk citizens' lives as a matter of strategic
•principle-denying terrorists the power gained from negotiation3-because
1. See Chinese Dissidents Give Wary Welcome to Release of Wang Dan, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Apr. 19,1998 (using the term and describing the "thousands still behind bars").
2. The term is generally used in the context of terrorists with hostages. See, e.g., Clyde
Haberman, New Steps in Middle Eastern Hostage Diplomacy, N.Y. TLMES, Sept. 13,1991, at A8
(using term when describing negotiations to free Western hostages held in Lebanon); Ending
the Hostage Crisis in Peru (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 22,1997) (ABC Nightline) (using
term in context of Peruvian hostage crisis). It has, however, been used in the context of
political prisoners before, see Policy Towards the United States "Matter of Concern", BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 6,1995 (describing "North Korea's 'helicopter hostage
diplomacy'), and even to describe the release of Chinese dissidents. See Simon Long,
Tiananmen Anniversaty Sowing Seeds of Economic Dissent, THE GUARDIAN (London), June 4,
1994, at 15 (describing the release of Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming as part of the "hostage
diplomacy that led up to the US renewal of Most Favoured Nation status").
3. The official U.S. policy has been to refuse to negotiate with terrorists. See A. L. Dewitt,
The Ultimate Exigent Circumstance, 5 KA'\. J.K. & PUB. POL'Y 169,172 (1996); Harold Hongju
Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair,
97 YALE L.J. 1255,1288 (1988); K. A. McNeely-Johnson, United States v. Nixon, Twenty Years
After: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly-an Exploration of Executive Privilege, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
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the United States speaks for its people in the international arena. This
obligation to protect their well-being and the standing to represent them is
consistent with the traditional international relations conception of states
as the primary subjects and objects of international law and of individuals
as gaining legal personality through their citizenship.
J[4 International concern over the treatment of Chinese prisoners, on
the other hand, derives from notions of universal jurisdiction that
undergird modem human rights law. Some actions, regardless of whether
they occur within a state's sovereign jurisdiction, are so unacceptable that
any State can intervene Of particular relevance in relation to prisoners is
the international ban on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. Both as a matter of treaty6 (one of the few human
rights conventions to which China is a party)7 and customary international
law,8 China is legally- prohibited from allowing the official torture of its
citizens. In the case of Wei Jingsheng and many others, China quite clearly
committed or allowed unacceptable torture.9
I5 The situation becomes trickier from a legal perspective, however,
because the international concern focused on far more than China's
unacceptable treatment of dissidents within prison. The underlying
injustice committed against Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan, as well as the
many other political prisoners who continue to languish in prison, is
imprisoning them because of their beliefs and expression of them."
Although China has signed the International Covenant on Economic Social
and Cultural Rights and has agreed to become party to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it is still in the process of domestic
incorporation and thus is not yet fully bound by either of them." China
251,285 (1994). For a discussion of different approaches to dealing with terrorists, see Ayaz R.
Shaikh, A Theoretic Approach to Transnational Terrorism, 80 GEO. L.J. 2131 (1992).
4. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLuC INrERNATIONAL LAW 58-70, 407-20 (4th ed.
1990); see also Nottebohm Case (Second Phase), ICJ Reports (1955).
5. See BROWNuE, supra note 4, at 300-05; Kenneth Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under
International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1988).
6. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment,
G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72, 23 I.L.M. 1027
(1984), revised by 24 I.L.M. (1985).
7. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment: Signatories (visited July 26,1998)
<http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part boo/iv boo/iv 9.html>.
China made reservations to article 20 (allowing the Committee Against Torture to investigate)
and paragraph 1 of article 30 (providing for arbitration), thus limiting international
intervention. See id.
8. Torture has been widely described as a jus cogens violation, not allowed by any state.
See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 716 (9th Cir. 1992) (describing torture
as jus cogens violation); Al Adsani v. Government of Kuwait, High Court of Justice: Queen's
Bench Division, appealed to Supreme Court of Judicature (1995) (still pending) (same).
9. See China Frees Ailing Dissident to Have Treatment in US, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 17,
1997, at 11 (describing Wei Jhngsheng as having "endured almost two decades of torture and
deprivation in Chinese gulags because of his demands for more democracy"); see
also AMNESry INT'L, CHINA: No ONE Is SAFE 63-84 (1996).
10. See sources supra note 9; China Warns Dissident Wang and Wei Are Still Criminals,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Apr. 29,1998.
11. See China Arrests Another Prominent Democracy Advocate, N.Y. TwES, Apr. 4,1998,
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recognizes these rights in its Constitution, but that document also states
that the Standing Committee interprets their meaning.
12
16 The only basis then, as a matter of law, for intervening with China's
imprisonment of its own citizens for their political beliefs would be if these
expressive rights apply to China as part of customary international law.
Not only is such a proposition debatable,13 but as a practical matter,
international legal action against China on these grounds seems unlikely.
97 And this, of course, is where diplomacy comes into play. Countries
attempt to achieve through the political process what the weak
international legal system cannot support. Human rights become part of
the bargain, in part, because other mechanisms cannot accord the same
protection. When, for example, Nazi victim Hugo Princz could not obtain
redress against Germany through the judicial process, the United States
negotiated reparations for him. 4
8 Objections to bargaining over Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan's
release thus should be read as implying a more nuanced concern than
simply bargaining over human beings. Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan
became symbols for the human rights movement and Western
governments of Chinese repression." Human rights advocates relied on
concern over these individuals to bring attention to the larger problem of
imprisonment of political dissidents. The movement focused on these
courageous men, but always kept the larger problems in mind.
59 Chinese and American leaders, however, used these symbols as a
publicly potent means of displaying progress on human rights without the
more difficult work of fundamentally changing China's approach to
political dissent. The problem with the releases-in and of themselves
positive events-was not that the United States bargained for them, but
that it lost sight of the larger issues in its bargaining. The focus was on the
well-known figures rather than changing repressive practices more
broadly. The releases did not represent a broader human rights victory
because they occurred in the context of continuing repression of the exact
sort used against these two heroes and of forcing them into exile.
at A3.
12. See XIANFA [Constitution], arts. 35,67 (1982) (P.RC.). "The National People's Congress
of the People's Republic of China is the highest organ of state power. Its permanent body is
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress." Id. art. 57.
13. For a discussion of whether freedom of expression is part of customary international
law, see, for example, Paul H. Brietzke, Insurgents in the "New" International Law, 13 Wis. INrr'L
LJ. 1, 35 (1994) (claiming that "freedom of expression is widely recognized, but it is not a
norm of customary international law"); Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INrr'L & COMP. L. 287,348 (1995/96)
(arguing that the widespread restrictions on freedom of expression established in article 19 of
the declaration make it difficult to claim it is protected by customary international law
without major restrictions).
14. See Nazi Camp Survivors Face Deadline, WASH. POST., Jan. 24,1997, at A30.
15. Their frequent mention by the news media illustrates their symbolic significance. A
search on Lexis reveals 3,613 news stories mentioning Wei Jingsheng in the past two years
(News: Curnws search, May 17,1998). Similarly, Wang Dan was mentioned 3,368 times in the
past two years (News: Cumws search, May 27,1998).
1998]
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II. IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY
110 This "hostage-diplomacy" thus creates a dilemma for the human
rights community. Focusing on individuals often is the only way to achieve
legislative or diplomatic progress. The limited U.S. human rights exception
to foreign sovereign immunity, for instance, came in response to the
inability of victims of the Pan Am 103 bombing to gain redress.16 The plight
of particular people arouses more compassion than abstract groups-and
produces easier sound-bites for those focused on public image. A strategy
of "opportunistic incrementalism" which seizes upon these instances may
provide one of the few ways to create change. 7
[11 And yet the very potency of these human symbols allows them to
be used not only by the victims and their advocates, but also by similarly
opportunistic oppressors and politicians. The focused media attention
upon the plight of Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan allowed their release to
represent human rights improvement. By sending these two leaders into
exile, the Chinese also shifted attention away from its treatment of other
political prisoners.
[12 The symbol of the heroic dissident thus serves as a double-edged
sword for those who wish to improve human rights, whether in China or
anywhere else in the world. The critical issue, from a strategic perspective,
is how to gain the attention and positive action without sacrificing the
larger cause. While there are no easy answers, the experience of the
releases of Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan suggests some strategies-
already followed by many in the human rights community."8 .
I13 First, the human rights activists should not decouple the Symbolic
use of people from the larger issues. Although calls for the release of a
particular individual are powerful-and good sound-bites-they always
should be accompanied by discussion of the many others who are still
imprisoned and the broader problems. Such an approach makes it harder
for authoritarian leaders to subvert these human symbols.
[14 Second, individuals do matter. Human rights at their core are not
16. See Harvey Berkman, Lawyers Solve Lockerbie Case Glitch Just in Time, NAT'L L.J., May
19,1997, at A8.
17. The political resolution of the Hugo Princz case provides another example of legal
change happening because of the plight of a particular individual. See supra note 14 and
accompanying text. I also have suggested this approach in the context of foreign sovereign
immunity. See Hari M. Osofsky, Foreign Sovereign Immunity from Severe Human Rights
Violations: New Directions for Common Law Based Approaches, 11 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 35,61-68
(1998).
18. See, e.g., AI Report 1998: China (visited July 26,1998)
<http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar98/asa17.htm> (describing the situation of
many imprisoned for exercising political and expressive rights); Human Rights Watch/Asia
(visited July 26,1998) <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/worldreport/Asia.htm#Pl99 96123>
(same); Lorien Holland, China's Dissidents Urge Jiang to Releases More Prisoners After Wei,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Nov. 17,1997 (describing dissidents' calls for China to release more
prisoners in addition to Wei Jingsheng); U.S./China: Clinton Will Talk Human Rights at the
Summit, BULLEnT's FRONTRUNER, June 22,1998 ('[Amnesty International] also urged
Clinton to raise the issue of little-known prisoners whose fate has been obscured by the high-
profile releases of dissidents Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan.,").
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simply about the systemic change that preserves them, but as important,
about ending the terrible suffering of particular people. Wei Jingsheng and
Wang Dan are tremendous individuals who courageously have tried to
lead China towards much needed democratization. The fact that they no
longer languish in prison is a victory. The reality that they cannot be in
their country to provide leadership is a tragedy. The human rights
movement always will be about such individuals because they are the
reason it exists in the first place.
15 Finally, Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan, with their new-found
freedom, can help lead those who care about human rights in China
towards new specifics and symbols. They and the rest of the human rights
community human rights community can and often do use their release as
a step forward rather than allowing it to eclipse the plight of so many
others.'9 By naming more names and telling more stories, the pressure on
Washington and Beijing can continue.
[16 At some level, both human rights activists and political leaders
engage in a form of "hostage-diplomacy." The real question is whether the
diplomacy will empower the victims or the oppressors. Through critically
examining the use of these "symbols" and then carefully crafting a strategy,
this "hostage-diplomacy" can be a tool in freeing not only Wei Jingsheng
and Wang Dan, but the many who are left behind.
19. See supra note 18.
1998]
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